Leon Kass:
(Alive Today)
238-250
From *The Wisdom of Repugnance*

Kass starts off by noting that revulsion in itself does not constitute a good argument against a practice, idea or object. However, the widespread repugnance that is felt for the cloning of humans is not a simple expression of irrational emotions. It is dismay and horror that is provoked by the prospect of the violation of human individuality, the radical change of the part that sex has to play in our lives, the destruction/modification of family relationships, and the change from giving birth to children to the fabrication of children that is implied by the practice of human cloning.

Kass points out that there are typically three views advanced for human cloning, the technological view, the rights/freedoms (liberal) view, and the progressive (meliorist) view. On the technological view, cloning is considered to be an extension of current techniques that we use to enable/enhance reproduction and to select the genetic makeup of children (fertility techniques and genetic screening). Like these techniques, cloning is not considered to be a moral category in itself (as automatically immoral), but is subject to good and bad uses.

On the rights/freedoms view, human cloning is a new and welcome option for exercising a person’s “right to reproduce or have the kind of child one wants to have.” (239) Also, cloning can be seen as a way to enhance our liberation, especially in the case of women, from the limits of nature and the dictates of chance because it frees us from the need for sexual mating. On this view, the only moral constraints are consent of the cloner and the physical safety of the clonant.

On the progressive view, (valetudinarians-- people obsessed with their own health) human cloning is a new method for improving human beings, Minimally by making copies of known healthy individuals, or Maximally by genetically engineering children to desired specifications using “preserved” outstanding genetic material. So human cloning is a means to the great and wonderful end of enhanced brains, beauty and strength.

Kass notes that these three views are ok in their place (in the industrial production of goods), but “are sorely wanting as approaches to human procreation.” (240) Such views undermine the mysteries of individuality, birth, renewal, and the significance of child-parent relations, because they ignore the fact that “we are erotic beings only because we are embodied beings {male and female} and not merely intellects and wills unfortunately imprisoned in our bodies.” (240)

**Deep Significance of Sex**

Kass suggests that instead of using a technological approach to understand the moral status of human cloning in terms of the wonderful benefits it will bring, we should use an anthropological approach instead, because it is the natural and social aspects of sexual reproduction that are at risk here.

Sexual reproduction is “the generation of new life from two complementary elements, one
female, one male {typically} through coitus…” (240) This form of reproduction is “natural” to all mammalian life. Each child has a male and a female {complementary} parent, and so each child unites two lineages. In sexual reproduction, the determination of the genetic constitution of the offspring is both a matter of nature and chance, not human design. So each child shares genetic traits with its two parents, but is also genetically unique.

Kass considers that these biological facts “foretell deep truths about our identity …” (240) We are all human, and each of us is part of a particular family structure, and each of us has a unique destiny, and each of us is capable of reproducing with the help of a complementary other. Also, our genetic individuality is an important part of what makes us natural humans. We are recognized by our distinctive appearance, we are distinguished by or unique fingerprints and self-recognizing immune system. Our genetic individuality “…symbolizes and foreshadows exactly the unique, never-to-be repeated character of human life.” (241)

Kass notes that almost all human societies have used these deep truths about begetting to structure child-rearing responsibilities, and to set individual identities and familial relationships. The universal “love of one’s own” is every ware exploited by cultures to insure that children are produced and properly cared for and to also form “clear ties of meaning, belonging, and obligation.” (241) It is wrong to consider such “naturally rooted practices” to be only cultural artifacts like table manners, or forms of dress that we can discard without cost. (241) Kingship {as we know it} would disappear without its “clear natural grounding.” (241) And it seems that our very identities would be undermined by this destruction. We would lose the great human meaning of sex and sexual reproduction.

Asexual reproduction is a radical change from the natural human way. It would confuse all of our normal understandings of mother, father, sister, brother, grandparent and of all of the attendant moral obligations. This is an even more radical departure, when the clone is not made from an embryo but an adult human to whom the clone would be an identical twin, or when the genetic constitution of the child is preselected by the parents. Consequently, cloning is vulnerable to three kinds of objections. First, cloning threatens identity and individuality, second cloning brings us closer to the transformation of procreation into a process of fabrication which objectifies children, and, third, cloning, like other kinds of eugenic enginery, “represents a form of despotism of the cloners over the cloned” (241) and so violates the significance of child--parent relation—“what it means to have a child, of what it means to say yes to our own demise and ‘replacement.’” (241)

Kass then answers an objection to his argument so far. Imagine if the world were different such that the natural form of human reproduction was asexual reproduction, and that scientists were talking about the benefits a new technological innovation, sexual reproduction for humans—hybrid vigor and increased individuality. In this situation, would it be legitimate to defend natural asexuality because it is natural? “Could one claim that it carried great human meaning?” (241)

Kass’s response to this objection is that human life—and even higher animal life--would have simple been impossible without sexual reproduction. Asexual reproduction is only found in the lowest forms of life, algae, fungi, bacteria, and some of the lower invertebrates. (241) Sexuality
requires a more complex relationship with the world. Sexual animals must seek complementary others to complete a goal which transcends their own existence. For a sexual animal, the world is not just composed of parts that can be eaten and parts that must be avoided. For such beings, the world also contains “very special and related and complementary beings.” (241) for such a being, the world is tinged with a desire for union—“the animal antecedent of human Éros and the germ of sociality. Not by accident is the human animal both the sexiest animal—whose females do not go into heat but are receptive thought the estrous cycle and whose males must therefore have greater sexual appetite and energy to reproduce sexually—and also the most aspiring, the most social, the most open, and the most intelligent animal.” (242) In the case of humans, our sexual natures produce a longing for wholeness and immortality.

Kass notes that in the case of asexual reproduction, one individual buds and a new genetically identical individual is born, but the originating individual can continues to live. Thus, the original being can be doubly preserved. Even if the original being dies, it leaves a twin of itself behind. But in the case of sexual beings, each individual is fated to not only die, but to disappear entirely and can only transcend death to a limited extent by producing a non-identical replacement through sexual reproduction.

When a husband and wife produce a child, this child is their genuine unification. Here, the two become one both physically and through the joint love and care for the child—flesh of their flesh. Thus, they open a future beyond the grave in this child. So human sexual reproduction is not simply an activity rationally willed by us, it also engages us bodily, spiritually, and erotically. Kass thinks that the separation of procreation from love, sex, and intimacy is deeply dehumanizing, no matter how wonderful the “good” of cloning might be. (242)

**Evils of Cloning**

Kass considers that human cloning constitutes an unethical experiment on the resulting child. Today, the problems caused by using aged/defective adult genetic material have yet to be solved. Even if cloning techniques can be improved so that a healthy child can be produced reliably, we cannot assume that the future child will want to be a clone.

In the case of intentionally cloning a child with defects, one can object that a life with physical defects is better than no life at all. However, Kass points out cases in which people have harmed their offspring in the very act of conception, AIDS Babies, Heroin Babies (addicted to heroin), or abandoned bastards. Kass notes that to bring such children into the world, intentionally, or negligently is unethical--likewise with defective clones.

**Lack of Clone’s Consent**

In the case of the impossibility of securing the clone’s voluntary informed consent, we do not just have the question of whether the clone in the future would have wanted to be a clone, but we also have the issue of this future clone’s capacity to answer this question as free autonomous agent being undermined by the intentions of the cloners and by the process of cloning and raising this clone. Insofar as the child’s behavior is determined by his selected genetic makeup and “rearing as a clone,” [Imagine doing the things necessary to create a second Einstein], we can
doubt his capacity to give consent as a free/moral agent. Just the clone’s self knowledge of the fact that he is a particular person’s clone rather than “an unbidden surprise..gift to the world” (243), must adversely affect the clone’s capacity to make free choices.

Kass then tells us cloning would create serious issues of identity and individuality. To begin, the clone is likely to feel concern because he is physically identical to his progenitor. Also, in the case the progenitor raises the clone, the clone might feel additional distress/confusion because he is the twin of his father—if one can still call the progenitor father in this case. Kass wonders what would be the great psychological burdens associated with being the “parent” or “child” of your twin. Moreover, the clone will be saddled with a genetic makeup that has already lived. Other people will doubtless compare him always to his progenitor.

One can say that genotype is not destiny and so has little relation to identity and individuality. It is true that the clones upbringing and circumstances will be different, so he will differ from his progenitor. Still, the child’s genetic makeup will predispose the child towards the same activities the progenitor was good at, and one can expect efforts from parents and others to mold the child after the original, because the point of cloning is to reproduce the original. Therefore, “genotype obviously matters plenty.” (243)

If it were really true that genotype has nothing to do with identity or individuality, then people ought not to object to being cloned without their consent as strenuously as they do. But most people are quite bothered by such a prospect, and they are not just concerned by the possibility of future liability; they are concerned about the production of a genetic twin of themselves.

Kass considers that genetic distinctiveness signifies “uniqueness of each human life and the independence [from] its parents that each human child rightfully attains.” (244) This genetic distinctiveness forms the bases of an important support for human life—social identity and kinship relationships. Cloning radically confuses social identity and kinship. Kass then gives us the case in which a female clone expects paternal attention and support from “grandpa,” the father of her “mother.”

Social identity and social ties of relationship and responsibility are widely based on biological kinship. The social taboo of incest serves to make biological lineage clear--especially which child belongs to which parents, and to not confuse the social identity of children and parents and siblings with the social identities of spouses, co parents, and lovers. It is true that the process of adoption alters social identity, and artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization with donor sperm, and whole embryo donation seem to cause problems for social identity. But even in these cases, as is true for all sexual reproduction, the child can be traced back to a male and female progenitor.

Kass points out that self-cloning results in a form of incest without coitus—because one ends up being the parent of one’s twin sister or twin brother. Also, what will it then mean to be mother, father, grandfather, aunt, cousin, and brother etc? “Who will bear what ties and what burdens?”. (244) What kind of social identity can one have with a whole side, “father” or “mother” excluded? Such confounding of social relationships and kinship can only be bad for children because it will deprive them of social support.
**Fabricating Children**

Next, Kass tells us that cloning brings us closer to the transformation of procreation into a process of fabrication which objectifies children into commercial commodities. With cloning, the total genetic makeup of an individual is selected by human designers. Of course, the child will differentiate from the original because of its different history, and be recognizably human. Still, this is a major step forward in the transformation of begetting children into making children. In this way mankind will become another one of those manmade things, an artifact.

In the case begetting, a being is formed, the way that we were formed, by what we are. In the case of making, the artificer stands above the artifact he makes as a superior, no matter how excellent the product, controlling it with his will and creative powers. So in human cloning, prospective “parents” and scientists adopt the same technocratic mentality, the children produced are their artifacts made so to serve certain purposes.

Kass considers such an arrangement to be very dehumanizing, no matter how wonderful the product. Mass-scale production of the same individual makes this shockingly clear. Still, even the cloning of one human being is “the violation of human, freedom, and dignity…” (245) Kass notes that this will lead to the commercialization of child production—commodities ordered, manufactured and sold.

Finally, if human cloning becomes commonplace, this will foster a deep misunderstanding of what it means to have children and the child-parent relationship. In natural sexual procreation, we know that our children are not our children, that is that even though they have come from us, they are destined to live their own lives, different than ours. Having a child this way is saying yes to whatever child that happens to be. Kass notes that a lot of damage has been caused by parents who try to live vicariously through their children, but cloning parents will not just have hopes for their children, they will have expectations. So cloning is despotic, for the child is given a specific genotype, a blueprint of a past life, that is intended to control the child’s life, and this contradicts the open ended and forward looking meaning of natural child-parent relationships.

**Slippery Slope to Totally Fabricated Babies**

Kass notes that the practice of cloning humans will likely one day lead to the production of babies entirely in the lab with a totally genetically engineered genotype. This will be justified in the name of reproductive freedom and the scientific freedom to discover new things and implement improvements.

Kass considers that if the right to reproduce means the right to have the kind of child one wants, then this right has no limits. But the right to reproduce is a problematic notion. This is because rights typically belong to individuals, but the right to reproduce cannot be exercised alone. So it is unclear who has this right. Does this right belong only to couples, only married couples, one or more parents, the woman who wants the child? Obviously, there is also the question of what this right is. “Is is a right to have your own biological child? Is it a right only to attempt reproduction or a right also to succeed? Is it {truly} a right to acquire the baby of one’s choice?” (246)
Kass thinks that a negative right to reproduce makes sense as a protection against government interference. But such a right cannot give us the bases for a tort case against nature that must be made good by science when efforts at natural reproduction fail. One might say that the right to reproduce must also include “the right against state interference with the free use of all technological means to obtain a child.” (246) However, Kass thinks that this claim goes too far because, as previously detailed, this would be a freedom to do immoral things. Even today, any community can lawfully prohibit polygamy, surrogate pregnancy, or the sale of babies to infertile couples “without violating anyone’s basic human right to reproduce.” (246) Whenever a liberty which was previously perceived to be harmless is extended to include immoral practices, that liberty must be adjusted/limited to fit our scruples.

Kass notes that today we already practice negative eugenics selection through prenatal diagnoses and genetic screening. But these practices have the purpose of preventing the birth of children with serious genetic diseases. At some future time, direct genetic manipulation might be possible to fix these children, and Kass has no objection against such practices in principle because it is the healing of existing individuals—which we can call therapeutic. But therapy implies and existing patient and the intent to restore health. So we cannot consider genetic enhancement {or cloning} to be in any way therapeutic.

In the case of fetus development, if we blur the line between health promotion {negative eugenics} and genetic enhancement {positive eugenics}, Kass thinks that we will have opened the door to all genetic designs. “Being over eight feet tall will likely produce some very good chances in life, and so will having the looks of Marilyn Monroe, and so will genius-level intelligence.” (247)

Someone could insist that there are legitimate uses for cloning that can be distinguished from illegitimate uses {helping infertile couples to have a baby—which Kass would still disagree with}. Kass’s answer to this claim is to give us an example showing how such “legitimate uses” will [likely] merge with, or even turn into illegitimate uses. A doctor who owns a cloning and baby fabricating company talks to an infertile married couple about how he can help them have a child. He tells them that he can either make a clone of one of them, or he can manufacture a baby to their specifications. He warns them that if he makes a clone, the child will only be related to one of them, and that this might put strains on the marriage, and the child might suffer identity confusion, and that the child will suffer from the same genetically produced problems as the parent etc. He then produces a very attractive catalogue of super babies and suggests to the parents that they would be better off picking one of those.

**Ban Human Cloning**

Kass thinks that producing cloned children is unethical and will likely have dangerous consequences. Therefore, Kass thinks that there ought to be an international ban on human cloning, except {grudgingly} for cloning humans specifically for research with no intention of implanting embryos in a uterus, or otherwise producing children. (249)
Michael Tooley notes that human cloning is unethical at present because the technology that we have today is not yet good enough to produce healthy human clones with normal life spans. However, when future advances make human cloning a viable possibility, Tooley thinks that it could be quite useful. So, he assumes, for the sake of argument, that we can successfully clone humans, and argues that cloning humans is not intrinsically immoral. Then he considers whether cloning humans can be condemned on the bases of its consequences. So he identifies various benefits of human cloning, and finishes with by criticizing various objections to the cloning of humans.

Tooley considers that there are two ways of arguing that human cloning is intrinsically immoral, first, it violates the right of a person to be a unique individual, and second, it violates the right that a person has to an “open future,” in the sense that their lives have not been determined by others in some way.

The Right to a Genetically Unique Nature

The argument that that the uniqueness of individuals will be somehow damaged by cloning, appeals to the widely held notion that being a unique person is important. Here, Tooley questions whether it truly is the case that a person’s uniqueness is important, that is, for example, that one’s life would be less valuable, less worth living, if there were a distant planet on which there lived someone identical to oneself in every respect. But one must consider that there are two ways in which such a relation of “identical to” could come about. In the first case, A is identical to B because of deterministic causal laws. In the second case, it just happens that both individuals feely decide to do the same things, have the same feelings and thoughts and so on. Tooley considers that the second case is not troubling, and that the first case can be troubling only because this would mean that one’s life is determined, it is not troubling simply because there is someone identical to you living on another planet. (252)

However, Tooley points out that it is not necessary to settle the question of whether the existence of a person identical to oneself decreases the value of one’s life in connection with human cloning, because human cloning cannot produce persons that are qualitatively identical to their progenitors. This is because different life histories insure that clones will be different from their progenitors.

Therefore, the right to a unique nature argument must be changed into the right to have a genetically unique nature argument to work as an attack against human cloning. So here one can ask the question of whether or not we do have a right to a genetically unique nature? Tooley then
tests our intuitions about this question with a question of his own: would most people consider it to be simply morally wrong to give birth to identical twins? Tooley considers that it would it would be rather suppressing to find that many people felt that it was wrong.

A different approach to using this argument against human cloning is to appeal to some plausible theory of rights. Tooley thinks that such rights exist when there are serious individual interests that deserve to be protected. So here we can ask, are there any serious individual interests that are frustrated if a clone is produced—for the clone and the progenitor? Yet it seems that the existence of a clone does not affect an individual in the same way that being prevented from performing some harmless action, or being killed, or tortured does. “A distant clone might have no impact at all on one’s life.” (253)

Someone could object here, that the knowledge of the existence of one’s clone might be damaging to one’s sense of individuality. But such an attitude can only be based on an irrational belief, since individuals sharing the same genetic makeup can be, and likely will be, substantially different. Tooley thinks that we cannot base rights on an individual’s particular irrational belief, and that we can properly assign the blame for the cause of this distress on the person who has this irrational belief. Therefore, the actions of other people ought to not be limited to prevent such harm.

Tooley suggests that another way of thinking about this question is to imagine a world in which people with the same genotype are extremely common, and consider whether such a world would be inferior to our world. Let’s say that God is planning to create human beings in an alternate world. He rejects sexual reproduction because such “random shuffling of gens” will inevitably produce some individuals with physical and mental problems, and this would be cruel. He also rejects evolution which involves “mutations” for the same reason. So he instead decides to create a genetic constitution with the following two attributes, 1) it will not lead to physical and mental handicaps and will allow the individuals to grow in mind and spirit, and 2) the genetic makeup of the individuals can only differ in sex. So he creates Adam and Eve and they are genetically identical to each other except that Adam has a Y and X chromosome, while Eve has two X chromosomes. This means that all of their decedents will be genetically identical to Adam or Eve.

So if we were choosing from behind Rawls’s veil of ignorance, which of these two worlds, our world or the alternative world, would be the rational choice? Tooley suggests that the alternative world has some major advantages over ours. First, one would be guaranteed a genetic makeup free of dispositions towards physical and mental problems. Second, the distribution of inherited traits would be perfectly fair, and no one would start out particularly advantaged or disadvantaged. Third, the only significant difference between people would be “the quality of their souls,” because, besides the differences associated with the two possible sexes, they would be genetically identical. This would mean that in this alternative world, judgments of people would typically be less superficial than they are in our world. Tooley considers that these are serious reasons for preferring this alternative world to our world.

One might object here that it would be rather more difficult to tell who is who in this alternative world than it is in our world. But variations on this alternative world can solve this problem. For
example, God could additionally allow differences in genes which determine the appearance of face and hair. Thus, people could identify each other in this second alternative world in virtually the same way that we identify each other in our world. (This would, of course, would somewhat dilute the third advantage previously mentioned—someone might prefer blonds to brunets.) Still, this world would have to a large degree the same benefits of the first alternative world.

First, the preferability of this second world suggests that the added genetic difference is not valuable in itself, but is only valuable as a means of identification. Second, can one rationally hold that although genetic uniqueness is crucial, a very high degree of genetic similarity is not crucial (crucial because it creates a better world)? “(254) In this case, the genetic similarity between individuals would still be extremely high. Third, the genes that determine the initial structure of people’s brains would be identical in this second alternative world. So it would be irrational to hold both that genetic uniqueness is “morally crucial, and that a world in which individuals have the same genes that determine the initial structure of their brains could very well be superior to our world.

**Tooley thinks that these three considerations give us good reasons “for holding that one cannot plausibly maintain that individuals have a right to a genetically unique nature, without also holding that the actual world is to be preferred to the alternative world just described” (254)**

Tooley tells us that the problem of identification could be completely solved by another variation on the original alternative world. God could install in the heads of individuals radio unites that constantly broadcast their unique identities and which can also receive such broadcasts. Also, God would provide a database of identities to which the broadcast of different identities could be matched that everyone would have access to. In this way, individuals would have practically instant knowledge of the identities of all other people they encounter. In this third alternative world, people would receive the full benefit of the three previously mentioned advantages of the first alternative world, because they would, again, be entirely genetically identical, aside from an X and a Y chromosome. So we could again ask if it is really true that the fact that the individuals in the alternative world are essentially genetically identical is a good reason for preferring our world to this third world?

**The Right to a Open Future**

{Joel Feinberg—right to open future; Hans Jonas—right to ignorance of a certain sort} Another argument against human cloning is the one that says the people have a right to a open future, or a right to ignorance of a certain sort. So the argument goes that one’s genotype is likely to determine to a certain extent the possibilities that one has, and so limit the course of one’s future life, and therefore, the knowledge of the life of one’s clone might be somehow distressing and even affect one’s decisions, since one could consider that this clone’s life shows that certain possibilities are closed to one. Now, this would not be a problem if there is no clone to one, or one is ignorant of the existence of such a clone, or if the clone is one’s contemporary or is younger because in these cases, one cannot observe the total courses of these clones’ lives. So, this problem would seem to arise in the case that the clone’s life precedes one’s life.

Tooley then asks if a person feels that his choices in life are constrained by the knowledge of the
life of a preceding clone, then what kind of reasoning can be the source of this feeling? Perhaps one noted that the clone had tried really hard for a long time to achieve some difficult goal, and failed to get anywhere near it. Let’s say that the previous clone wasted his whole life trying to be the first person to swim across the Atlantic in 60 days {Benoit Lecomte, 1967, 72 days}. One could here reasonably conclude that this goal is one that is closed to one. But would such knowledge be a bad thing? Tooley thinks that such knowledge could be a good thing, because it would help one to pick goals that are achievable.

A different possibility is that one is studying the life of one’s clone and come to the conclusion that it would be impossible to live a life which is significantly different from one’s clone. But Tooley points out that here is no evidence to support such a conclusion, and that there is evidence against this conclusion; studies of the lives of identical twins show that very different lives are possible given the same genotype. (255) So genetic determinism is false. (255)

The Benefits of Cloning:

**Answers to the Heredity vs Environment Issue:** An adequate theory of human development would be very useful for the general human project of rearing children who will have a better chance to realize their potentials. So you could have experiments in which several clones of one individual are given to different parents providing good, but significantly different environments. This would help us to answer many Nature-vs-Nurture questions about child development.

**Cloning to Benefit Society:** Tooley thinks that it is unlikely that one could clone individuals who have made great contributions to society and expect these clones to do things that are just as great. So even if you could closely reproduce the environments in which these great individuals developed {a very difficult proposition}, you could not reproduce all of the accidental happenings that contributed to their creative achievements. Still, if you make several clones of a great physicist, like Einstein, and you put them in environments conducive to the development of a physicist, it is likely that you will end up with a number of decent physicists. This more modest result would still be beneficial to society.

**Make Happier and Healthier Individuals:** We could clone individuals who are known to not have dispositions toward physical and mental disease and who have physical attributes and character traits that have brought them success in life.

**Make Children with Desired Traits:** A lot of couples would like to raise children with certain traits. They might want a particular appearance, or particular physical, or intellectual, or artistic abilities in their child. Coning would make this possible.

**Self-Knowledge Can Help With Child Rearing:** If you look back at your childhood, you can probable identify experiences that were both good and bad for your overall development. So, if you make a clone of yourself, you can use this self-knowledge to better raise your child.

**Infertility & Children for Homosexual couples:** Men without sperm and women without ova will be able to have “genetic” children. Also, homosexual couples will be able to have “genetic”
Cloning for Medical Purposes: Clone a child as a source of replacement parts for the progenitor {one need not kill or cause unacceptable harm the child to do this—depends on what parts are needed; bone marrow transplant for example}.

Other Objections:

Mindless Organ Banks: In this case, we have objections against cloning mindless organ banks for use as a source of replacement body parts. One objection against doing so is that one is thereby destroying a person. Tooley answers that that there is pretty good evidence to the fact that embryos do not have the capacities necessary to be persons, such as consciousness, thought and so on. Another objection is that the creation of such a bank is stopping a human organism from developing a brain and therefore depriving the immortal soul associated with this organism from experiencing life. Tooley answers that there is strong empirical data that suggests that our mental capacities reside in our physical brains, rather than in immaterial souls. A third objection is that such an act is wrong because “it involves the destruction of an active potentiality for personhood.” (259) But Tooley does not think that it is wrong to destroy an active potentiality for personhood (this is because a potential person is not a person). Finally, there is the objection that creating mindless organ banks is ghoulsh. Tooley considers that permitting ourselves to be guided by this emotional response is morally irresponsible, because the creation of such mindless organ banks will save many lives.

Cloning Servants: Here we have the idea that cloning humans will be abused to create large numbers of human slaves or enthusiastic soldiers. Tooley counters, that in the case of slaves, that it is not likely that, once human cloning becomes available, that societies rejection of slavery will then be considered a mistake, and, in the case of soldiers, that a dictator who failed to attract enough support to form an army would be able to attract enough support to help him construct a massive cloning program.

Psychological Distress: Here we have the idea that the clone could still feel distress at being a clone, either because he feels that his uniqueness is compromised or that his future is constrained even if it is true that cloning does not violate ones right to uniqueness, or genetic uniqueness, or a right to an open future. As mentioned earlier, Tooley considers that both of these beliefs must be irrational because genetic determinism is false. So, again, we cannot make laws that limit the actions of others in order to conform to irrational beliefs. Additionally, it is likely that such feelings will not persist once cloning becomes common because people will get used to it and have real evidence that cloning does not threaten individuality, or the possibility of an open future.

Not Treating Individuals as Ends in Themselves: This objection treats the case in which parents clone a child in order to save the life of that child, and that the clone does not need to be sacrificed or unduly harmed to do so. Let’s say that the child in question has leukemia and will be given a bone marrow transplant from his clone. The objection here is that the clone has been created only to save the life of the child and so represents a failure to view individuals as ends in
themselves. So here it seems that we are disregarding Kant’s duty to regard people not only as means to our ends, but also as ends in themselves. Tooley thinks that this situation would only be a violation of Kant’s *Respect of Persons Principle* if the parents abandoned the clone, or did not take sufficient care of the child once they had used his bone marrow. So even if the parents create this child for the express purpose of saving someone else, it is not likely that they will thereafter only treat that child as an end.

**Diminishing Personal Autonomy:** (Philip Kitcher) One could say cloning a human being with the aim of producing a particular type of person is morally wrong because this interferes with human autonomy. However, Tooley cannot see what is wrong with creating individuals who are free of genetic dispositions to physical and mental problems. Neither can he see what is wrong with producing individuals with desirable capabilities, personality traits, character traits, and interests. Tooley notes that if we consider such interventions to be morally wrong, then we must likewise condemn current and past child rearing practices in which parent attempt to foster desirable capabilities, personality traits, character traits, and interests in their children.